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In 3 studies, participants viewed sequences of multiattribute objects (e.g., colored shapes) appearing with
varying frequencies and judged the likelihood of the attributes of those objects. Judged probabilities
reflected a compromise between (a) the frequency with which each attribute appeared and (b) the
ignorance prior probability cued by the number of distinct values that the focal attribute could take on.
Thus, judged probabilities were partition dependent, varying with the number of events into which the
state space was subjectively divided. This bias was diminished among participants more confident in
what they learned, was strong and insensitive to level of confidence when ignorance priors were
especially salient, and required ignorance priors to be salient only when probabilities were elicited (not
during encoding).
Keywords: judgment, uncertainty, learning, partition dependence
An abundance of psychological research has explored how
people judge the likelihood of uncertain events, such as a future
rise in interest rates or the incumbent winning an upcoming
election. Many of these studies have focused on heuristic pro-
cesses that people use to evaluate the nature of possible events
and the relative strength of evidence supporting them (Gilovich,
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1982). For instance, one may infer that the Acme Company is
more likely to hire Alan than Richard because Alan more
closely resembles the prototypical Acme worker. More re-
cently, researchers have identified processes that people use to
evaluate likelihood on the basis of the number of events that
might occur (Fox & Clemen, 2005; Fox & Levav, 2004; Fox &
Rottenstreich, 2003; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Leg-
renzi, & Caverni, 1999). For instance, one may conclude that
Alan has a 20% chance of landing the Acme job because he is
one of five candidates for a single position.
Reliance on the nature and reliance on the number of possible
events are not mutually exclusive. To illustrate, consider the
chances that a particular stranger identifies more with the Demo-
cratic than Republican platform. In the absence of further infor-
mation, one might rely purely on the number of possible events:
Because both party affiliations appear equally plausible the “igno-
rance prior” probability of 1/2 may appear to be the most appro-
priate response. Subsequently, as one learns more about the person
in question, one might make adjustments based on the nature of
events. For instance, one might rely on the representativeness
heuristic, noting that “this person’s features are more similar to my
prototype of a Democratic voter,” or the availability heuristic,
reasoning “it is much easier to recall having met Democrats around
here than Republicans.”
The use of ignorance priors, though intuitively appealing, can
lead to systematic bias. In particular, if people place any weight on
ignorance priors, then probabilities will vary systematically with
the way in which people subjectively partition the state space. To
illustrate such partition dependence, consider the following sce-
nario that we presented to 89 visitors of the Duke University
student union:
Fletcher Motor Sales is a small automobile dealership that sells two
models of automobiles: coupes (2-door) and sedans (4-door). Fletcher
employs four salespersons. It employs Carlos Tamayo as a coupe
salesperson and Jennifer Burkhardt, Damon Jones, and Sebastian Cruz
to sell sedans. Fletcher stocks sedans in the colors white, blue, black,
and silver and coupes in red and green. A customer has just come to
the Fletcher dealership to trade in his old car for a new one of the
exact same model.
Note that any transaction at this dealership is characterized by the
following two attributes: model (coupe, sedan) and salesperson
(Carlos, Jennifer, Damon, Sebastian). One group of participants
(n  43) was asked “What is the probability that the customer
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1385trades in a coupe?” This question facilitates a twofold partition by
model of car. A second group (n  46) was asked “What is the
probability that the customer buys a car from Carlos?” This ques-
tion facilitates a fourfold partition by salesperson. Assuming par-
ticipants believe that each salesperson does indeed sell only one
model of automobile, the two queries identify the same event, but
using two different attributes. Thus, if participants rely at all on
ignorance priors cued by the target attribute, they should be biased
toward 1/2 when asked about coupes and toward 1/4 when asked
about Carlos.
The results indeed exhibited attribute-cued partition depen-
dence. The median judged probability that a customer buys a
coupe was .33, whereas the median judged probability that a
customer buys a car from Carlos was .25, p  .004 (one-tailed) by
Kruskal–Wallis test.
1 Moreover, a greater proportion of respon-
dents answered 1/2 when asked about the coupe (42%) than when
asked about Carlos (17%; p  .01, by Fisher’s exact test), and a
greater proportion of respondents answered 1/4 when asked about
Carlos (48%) than when asked about the coupe (28%; p  .04).
The same pattern of results appeared when we ran the study again
using a within-participant design.
2
Reliance on ignorance priors has been previously demon-
strated for natural events for which participants must draw on
their real-world knowledge (Fox & Clemen, 2005; Fox &
Levav, 2004; Fox & Rottenstreich, 2003; Smithson & Segale,
2006). In the car dealership example, participants had little
information on which to draw other than the number of sales-
people and models of car (cf. Johnson-Laird et al., 1999).
However, it is an open and important question whether people
rely on attribute-cued ignorance priors, and therefore exhibit
partition dependence, in situations in which they can readily
observe the relative frequencies of events. Previous investiga-
tors have extended judgmental biases such as the alternative
outcomes effect (Windschitl, Young, & Jenson, 2002) and
subadditivity (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003; Koehler, 2000) into
learning paradigms. Our primary purpose in this article is to
likewise explore the extent to which people rely on attribute-
cued ignorance priors (i.e., the number of potential events)
versus observed relative frequencies (i.e., the nature of these
events) in a controlled learning environment in which informa-
tion concerning both the number and nature of events is readily
available.
Perhaps the most natural hypothesis is that once people gain a
modicum of knowledge about the true frequencies of events, they
will discard the ignorance prior and rely exclusively on what they
have learned about these frequencies. Consistent with this view is
a substantial literature showing that when people can observe
events, they are generally quite accurate at learning how often
these events occur. Indeed, many authors have argued that people
tend to automatically encode frequency information (e.g., Alba,
Chromiak, Hasher, & Attig, 1980; Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Naveh-
Benjamin & Jonides, 1986).
Alternatively, it may be that once people gain knowledge about
true frequencies, they continue to be influenced by ignorance
priors. Consistent with this view, there is evidence that judged
relative frequencies tend to be biased toward salient reference
points. For example, Varey, Mellers, and Birnbaum (1990) showed
participants squares containing white and black dots; the relative
frequency of the two colors was varied, and participants estimated
the proportion of dots that were white (or black). Overestimation
predominated for proportions less than 1/2, whereas underestima-
tion predominated for proportions greater than 1/2 (for similar
results, see Attneave, 1953; Erlick, 1964; Fiedler & Armbruster,
1994; Fox & Tversky, 1998, Study 2; Parducci & Wedell, 1986;
Sheridan & Ferrell, 1974; Wickens, 1992. Hollands and Dyre,
2000, demonstrated a more general pattern of over- and underes-
timation around alternative reference points).
A secondary purpose of this article is to attempt to integrate
the literature showing relative accuracy of frequency judgment
with the literature showing systematic bias in proportion judg-
ment by proposing that people rely on a compromise between
their impression of relative frequency (the nature of events) and
ignorance priors (the number of events). We propose further
that the relative weight afforded these two sources of informa-
tion is influenced by (a) a judge’s confidence in his or her
ability to estimate the relative frequency of events and (b) the
salience of the ignorance prior. We study these factors using a
learning paradigm because it provides an ideal environment for
experimentally controlling information that is presented, mea-
suring subjective confidence in what has been learned, and
manipulating the salience of ignorance priors.
In three studies, we investigate partition dependence cued by
attributes (like that illustrated by the foregoing car dealership
example) in controlled learning environments. Our first study
establishes that reliance on ignorance priors persists in a learning
context and that this effect is diminished with subjective confi-
dence in what has been observed. Our second study reveals that
when ignorance priors are especially salient, they can bias likeli-
hood judgment even for individuals who are highly confident in
their memory for what they had observed. Our final study illus-
trates that ignorance priors can influence judged probabilities,
provided they are salient at the time of judgment (i.e., retrieval),
but they need not be salient when frequencies of events are learned
(i.e., during encoding). We conclude with a discussion of factors
that influence the salience of alternative partitions, the relationship
between the present account and Bayesian models of likelihood
judgment, and directions for future research. A formal character-
ization of the ignorance prior model (Fox & Rottenstreich, 2003)
is provided in Appendix A.
Study 1: Establishing Reliance on Attribute-Cued
Ignorance Priors
In Study 1 we investigate whether participants’ recall of fre-
quency information is biased toward attribute-cued ignorance pri-
ors. Participants observed a set of randomly ordered multiattribute
events (restaurant receipts for various meals on various days). Our
main hypothesis is that judged likelihood would be biased toward
the ignorance prior suggested by the target attribute (meal of the
1 Unless otherwise specified, because we make ex ante directional pre-
dictions, we use one-tailed test statistics throughout the article.
2 We asked 76 undergraduates at the University of Southern California
to complete an identically worded within-participant version of this sce-
nario, counterbalancing the order in which each participant answered the
two questions (coupe vs. salesperson). We found no order effects and the
same mean and median pattern of results as in the between-participants
version. The median-judged probability that a customer buys a coupe was
.48, whereas the median-judged probability that a customer buys a car from
Carlos was .28 (p  .001, by Wilcoxon test).
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the extent to which people rely on attribute-cued ignorance priors
versus true frequencies when they can readily observe the latter.
Second, we investigate the role of subjective knowledge and
confidence on use of the ignorance prior. Previous research in a
decision analysis context (Fox & Clemen, 2005) has shown a
stronger bias toward ignorance priors among participants who
rated themselves as less knowledgeable. Likewise, in the present
investigation we expected that bias toward ignorance priors would
be more pronounced in this learning context among participants
who felt less confident in their memory and less knowledgeable
about likelihood estimation tasks.
Finally, we explore whether reliance on ignorance priors is
affected by response mode. Some authors have argued that biases
in judged probability disappear when people are instead asked to
judge relative frequencies (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996; for a rebuttal,
see Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), whereas others have observed
that biases in judged probability persist in relative and absolute
frequency judgment, though their magnitude may diminish slightly
(e.g., Koehler, 2000; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983; Tversky & Koehler, 1994).
Method
Participants. We recruited 267 undergraduates at the University of
Pennsylvania to participate in a set of unrelated experiments lasting a total
of approximately 1 hr in exchange for course credit.
Design and procedure. The experiment was administered on com-
puter. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions that varied by
response mode. In one condition (n  134), participants were asked to
assess the probability that a randomly selected object would have various
features. In the other condition (n  133), participants were asked to recall
the proportion of events that had these features.
Participants were told that they would view information about a large
number of meals that a person named Joe had eaten at a local restaurant.
3
Participants were shown an example of a receipt with two pieces of
information (i.e., two attributes of the restaurant visit): the meal category
(breakfast, lunch, or dinner) and the day of the week (Sunday, Monday,
. . ., Saturday). Participants were then told that each of Joe’s receipts would
be quickly flashed on the screen, and they were instructed to try to get an
intuitive sense of how often Joe ate particular meals at the restaurant and
how often he ate at the restaurant on particular days of the week. They were
also told that after viewing the receipts they would be asked to judge the
likelihood of the events they observed. We assumed that for most partic-
ipants the “meals” attribute would suggest a threefold partition and an
ignorance prior of 1/3, whereas the “days of the week” attribute would
suggest a sevenfold partition and an ignorance prior of 1/7.
The receipts were white rectangles with a black outline that were
approximately 1.5-in. wide  2.5-in. high (3.8-cm wide  6.4-cm high).
The background of the screen was light gray. Centered at the top of each
receipt, written in black text in 18-point font, were the two attributes: the
meal category and the day, with the meal category listed on the line directly
above the day. The receipts were flashed on the screen, one at a time, for
a total of 40 receipts, and the order of receipts was randomized for each
participant. Each receipt appeared on the screen for 0.75 s followed by a
blank screen for 0.50 s. We randomly selected a target day and target meal
for each participant to appear with a fixed relative frequency of .25 (i.e., 10
flashes out of 40). We selected this frequency because it is approximately
midway between the presumed ignorance prior of the day attribute (1/7, or
.14) and the meal attribute (1/3, or .33). Thus, if participants anchor on
ignorance priors suggested by the queried attributes, they should overes-
timate the true frequency of the target meal, and they should underestimate
the true frequency of the target day. True frequencies of the other two
possible meals and six possible days were randomly generated.
Following the learning phase, participants were asked to estimate the
likelihoods of all 10 attributes (each of the three possible meals and seven
possible days) in an order that was randomized for each participant.
Participants in the probability condition were asked, “If a receipt is drawn
at random from the set you just observed, what is your best estimate of the
probability that the [meal / day] shown on the receipt is [breakfast /
Sunday]? Please state your answer as a percentage (0%–100%).” In con-
trast, participants assigned to the proportion condition were asked, “In
terms of the different types of meals in the set you just observed, what
proportion of Joe’s meals [were breakfasts] / [were eaten on Sunday]?
Please state your answer as a percentage (0%–100%).”
Next, participants were asked about their relevant confidence and knowl-
edge. The specific wording for the confidence item was “How confident
are you in your recollection of the events you just provided estimates for?”
The specific wording of the knowledge item was “How knowledgeable do
you feel judging frequencies, proportions, and probabilities?” Both items
were rated on a 7-point scale (1  not at all confident/knowledgeable,7
extremely confident/knowledgeable).
Results
Response mode. We found no significant differences in like-
lihood judgments of the target attributes between participants in
the proportion and probability conditions, nor did we find any
differences in relative reliance on ignorance priors versus true
frequencies (p  .46, two-tailed, across all analyses listed below).
Thus, we pooled the data from these response modes.
Judgments of target events. The distributions of likelihood
judgments for target meals and days are depicted in Figure 1.
Although the true relative frequency of these events was .25,
participants tended to underestimate the likelihood of target days
and overestimate the likelihood of target meals, as we predicted,
providing a median
4 judgment of .20 when queried about the target
day and .30 when queried about the target meal. These median
estimates, listed in Table 1, fall midway between true frequency
and the corresponding ignorance priors and are statistically distin-
guishable from both. The median judgment of target day (.20) is
significantly lower than the true frequency of .25 (p  .005, by
Wilcoxon test) and significantly higher than the ignorance prior of
.14 (p  .001). Likewise, the median judgment of target meal (.30)
is significantly higher than the true frequency of .25 (p  .003, by
Wilcoxon test) and significantly lower than the ignorance prior of
.33 (p  .001).
Additional evidence of attribute-cued partitioning can be seen in
an analysis of individual responses. The median within-participant
discrepancy between judgments of the target meal and target day
is .05, with a majority of participants (59%) reporting a higher
likelihood for the target meal than the target day, 6% reporting
equal likelihoods, and 35% reporting a higher likelihood for target
day than target meal (p  .001, by sign test).
Judgments of relative frequency. To measure how accurately
people learned overall relative frequency of the events, for each
participant we computed the correlation between that individual’s
judged probabilities and the associated true frequencies of all 10
attributes (each of the seven possible days and three possible
3 This cover story was inspired by Dougherty and Hunter (2003, Study 1).
4 In most instances the mean results followed an analogous pattern to the
median results. However, we chose to report medians and nonparametric
statistics because the data were nonnormal (the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
yielded 2.8, p  .001, for target day and 1.6, p  .01, for target meal).
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was independent of the analyses of target judgments, we also
computed the correlation between judged and true probabilities for
only the 8 nontarget attributes. These measures reflect a general
index of accuracy and learning of relative frequencies. The median
correlation across participants was .75 for all 10 attributes and .81
for the 8 nontarget attributes, suggesting that participants were
generally quite adept at learning relative frequencies and forming
likelihood estimates.
Regression analysis. We next converted probabilities and rela-
tive frequencies to a log-odds metric and regressed likelihood judg-
ments of all 10 attributes (seven days, three meals) on the ignorance
prior and true frequencies, separately for each participant. The regres-
sion equation, derived in Appendix A from Fox and Rottenstreich’s
(2003) ignorance prior model, can be written as follows:
ln R(F,A)  a  b1 ln
nf
na  b2 ln
f(F)
f(A),
where R(F, A) is the odds, derived from judged probabilities, of a
focal event F (e.g., ate at restaurant on a Wednesday) rather than its
alternative A (ate at restaurant on a day other than Wednesday); nf and
na are the number of qualitatively distinct levels that the focal and
alternative events, respectively, can take on (e.g., 1 and 6 for days of
the week); and f(F) and f(A) are the absolute frequencies in which the
focal and alternative events, respectively, appeared during the learn-
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Figure 1. Distribution of likelihood judgments for target day and meal in Study 1 (n  267).
Table 1
Results of Study 1
Sample p(target day) p(target meal)
p(meal) 
p(day)
p(meal)  p(day) p(meal)  p(day) p(meal)  p(day)
%%%
Overall (N  267) .20 .30 .05 59
* 63 5
Low competence (n  145) .20 .30 .05 65
* 33 2
High competence (n  122) .23 .26 .02 52.5 9 38.5
Note. Columns 2, 3, and 4 report median judged probabilities.
* p  .001 (one-tailed) by sign test.
1388 SEE, FOX, AND ROTTENSTREICHing phase. Thus, for each participant, we obtained an intercept term
and two separate regression coefficients: one coefficient that repre-
sented the influence of the ignorance prior and one that represented
the influence of observed frequency.
Median results accord with our major predictions (see top sec-
tion of Table 2). Participants relied on both observed frequency
(B  0.46, p  .001) and the attribute-cued ignorance prior (B 
0.36, p  .001). We note that the median intercept term of .13
was small but statistically significant (p  .001). This value,
although not predicted by the ignorance prior model (see Appendix
A), reflects a small downward bias in all probabilities.
5 Overall,
the fit of this model is good (median R
2  .61).
Competence effects. We were interested in whether people
exhibit more accurate judgments and less reliance on ignorance
priors when they feel more confident in their memory of the events
and more knowledgeable judging frequencies. The median confi-
dence judgment was 3.0, and the median knowledge judgment was
4.0. These items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s .74), so
we averaged the two items to form a composite measure of
self-rated competence judging likelihood.
We first looked at the effects of competence on judgments of target
events. Participants who rated themselves as less competent exhibited
greater reliance on attribute-cued ignorance priors: The Spearman
correlation between competence and the within-participant difference
score for median ratings of the target meal and target day was .12
(p  .028). To further probe this effect, we conducted a median split
on the competence measure. As shown in Table 1, the median
within-participant difference among those who rated themselves as
highly competent was .02, whereas the median difference among
those who rated themselves as less competent was .05, significantly
larger (p  .024, by Kruskal–Wallis test).
We examined the regression results to see whether self-reported
competence moderated the weights afforded ignorance priors ver-
sus true frequency. Because we were running separate regressions
for each individual participant, it was not possible to statistically
interact the competence measure with the independent variables
within each regression. Rather, we again relied on a median split
of the composite competence measure. Median coefficients for the
low- and high-competence groups are listed in Table 2 and reveal
significantly less reliance on true frequency (p  .022, by
Kruskal–Wallis test) and greater reliance on ignorance priors (p 
.048, by Kruskal–Wallis test) among those who rated themselves
as less competent compared with those who felt more competent.
Discussion
Study 1 provides evidence that people rely on ignorance priors
implied by the number of distinct values that the target attribute
could potentially take on, even in a controlled learning environ-
ment in which frequency information is readily available. Regres-
sion analyses provide further evidence that participants placed
appreciable weight on ignorance priors when forming likelihood
judgments. In addition, participants relied more on the ignorance
prior and less on their observation of true frequencies if they felt
less competent assessing likelihood. Finally, Study 1 shows that
none of these results are diminished among participants asked to
judge relative frequency rather than probability.
The finding that participants place more weight on ignorance priors
and less weight on observed frequencies when they feel less compe-
tent assessing likelihood could be viewed as rational Bayesian behav-
ior in which participants adopt attribute-cued ignorance priors as prior
probabilities and treat their impressions of relative likelihood as less
diagnostic when they feel less competent. Likewise, the negative
correlation between feelings of competence and reliance on ignorance
priors could be accommodated by Fiedler and Armbruster’s (1994)
information-loss model, according to which judged frequencies of
events regress toward an even distribution over all possible events the
noisier or more imperfect the learning. For Study 1, both Bayesian
and information-loss models predict that likelihood judgment will lie
between true frequency and the ignorance prior, closer to true fre-
5 To put this in perspective, the bias in judged probability implied by an
intercept of .13 varies from a maximum of .03 (in cases in which the
ignorance prior model predicts a response of p  .50) to .01 (in cases in
which the ignorance prior model predicts a response of p  .10 or .90).
Table 2
Median Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for All Studies
Study Frequency Ignorance prior Intercept R
2
Study 1
Overall (n  267) 0.46
* 0.36
* 0.13
* 0.61
*
Low competence (n  145) 0.42
* 0.41
* 0.11 0.62
*
High competence (n  122) 0.53
* 0.26
* 0.14
* 0.61
*
Study 2
Moderate salience (n  83) 0.72
* 0.15 0.00 0.76
*
Cognizant subset (n  40)
a 0.97
* 0.01 0.00 0.78
*
Low confidence (n  21) 0.71
* 0.15 0.00 0.78
*
High confidence (n  19) 1.06
* 0.05 0.00 0.75
*
Enhanced salience (n  84) 0.43
* 0.50
* 0.00 0.67
*
Low confidence (n  55) 0.46
* 0.50
* 0.00 0.66
*
High confidence (n  29) 0.40
* 0.40
* 0.00 0.71
*
Study 3
No-object-bar (n  73) 0.80
* 0.04 0.00 0.69
*
Retrieval-only (n  70) 0.50
* 0.44
* 0.00 0.71
*
Encoding  retrieval (n  86) 0.53
* 0.48
* 0.00 0.80
*
a Participants who reported exactly four shapes and two colors.
* p  .025 (one-tailed) by sign test.
1389 PARTITION DEPENDENCE AND LEARNINGquency as the judge’s confidence in what has been learned increases
(either because one’s impressions are more diagnostic of true frequen-
cies or because less information has been lost).
In the present article, we propose that the weight afforded the
nature versus number of events is affected not only by participants’
relative confidence in these sources of information but also by the
relative salience of these cues, as in other information integration
tasks (cf. Anderson, 1981). The question arises, however, how parti-
tion salience might interact with confidence. We surmise that reliance
on ignorance priors reflects an automatic tendency to incorporate
salient cues, whether or not these cues are perceived to be relevant. In
this respect ignorance priors may contaminate likelihood assessment
much like judgmental anchors contaminate magnitude estimation.
Prior research has demonstrated that although the impact of self-
generated anchors can be moderated by such factors as financial
incentives, explicit injunctions for accuracy, or inducing participants
to shake or nod their heads during judgment, the impact of more
accessible externally provided anchors is not sensitive to such factors
(Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2005). In a similar vein, although we found
that reliance on self-generated ignorance priors was sensitive to par-
ticipants’ perceived level of competence in Study 1, we predict that
reliance on ignorance priors will be less sensitive to level of confi-
dence if ignorance priors are made especially salient through an
exogenous prompt. Indeed, just as highly accessible, externally pro-
vided anchors can contaminate judgments of even the most confident
experts (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Northcraft & Neale,
1987; Wright & Anderson, 1989), particularly salient ignorance priors
may contaminate likelihood judgments of even the most confident or
knowledgeable individuals. In the following study, we explore this
potential interaction between perceived competence and salience of
attribute-cued ignorance priors.
Study 2: Interaction of Confidence and Partition Salience
Studies 2 and 3 differ from Study 1 in two important respects. First,
we move from a state space for which we expected participants to
have a priori notions concerning the number of possible events (there
are seven days in a week and three meals in a day) to a state space that
is constructed in an ad hoc manner so that participants should have no
prior expectations: Participants observed objects that could take on
one of four different shapes in one of two different colors. Construct-
ing an artificial state space allows us to experimentally control not
only true frequencies and ignorance priors but also the salience of
attribute-cued partitions. Second, we constructed a perfect corre-
lation among the attributes (one color was uniquely associated
with a single shape) so that we could ask participants to judge the
probability of a particular target event by asking about different
attributes of the same event. This allows for a stronger test of
partition dependence, which, strictly speaking, refers to the ten-
dency for judged likelihood of a particular event to vary with the
relative accessibility of alternative partitions.
Participants viewed a distribution of four colored shapes that
flashed one at a time on a computer screen with varying
frequencies and then judged the probabilities of each shape and
color. We manipulated the salience of attribute-cued partitions
by either including an explicit visual cue that displayed all
possible objects in a matrix by shape and color (cf. Fiedler &
Armbruster, 1994, Experiment 1) or asking participants to re-
port the different shapes and colors they had observed and then
reminding them of their responses at time of judgment. We also
elicited self-reported confidence and knowledge assessments as
in the previous study.
The present account yields two testable predictions. First, we pre-
dict that more weight will be afforded to the ignorance prior relative
to observed frequency (and partition dependence will therefore be
more pronounced) when attribute-cued partitions are made more
salient via an externally provided visual cue than when these parti-
tions are made less salient via an internally generated list of attributes.
Second, the impact of self-rated confidence on relative weights of
these cues (and the impact of self-rated confidence on partition de-
pendence) will diminish when partitions are more salient.
Method
Participants. Participants were 94 Duke University students and 73
University of North Carolina students, who were recruited to participate in
a set of unrelated computer studies lasting a total of approximately 1 hr and
for which they were paid $10.
Design and procedure. The experiment was administered on laptop
computers in a private meeting room in the student union of each univer-
sity. We used a between-participants design in which individuals were
randomly assigned to one of two salience conditions: a moderate salience
condition (n  83) and an enhanced salience condition (n  84).
Participants were told that they would view a distribution of multiat-
tribute objects that would be quickly flashed on the center of the screen in
a random order and instructed to try to get an intuitive sense of how often
each object appeared. They were also told that after viewing the objects
they would be asked to judge the probabilities of events they observed. The
design features of this study are depicted in Appendix B. Each of the four
objects in the set had two manipulated attributes: shape and color. Specif-
ically, the objects were approximately .75 in. (1.9 cm) across and took on
one of four shapes (triangle, circle, square, or diamond) and one of two
colors (black or gray). The background was white. We expected that for
most participants the shape attribute would suggest a fourfold partition and
ignorance prior of 1/4, whereas the color attribute would suggest a twofold
partition and ignorance prior of 1/2.
The relative frequencies of the four objects were determined at
random, subject to the constraint that each of the four objects would
appear a minimum of 5% of the time. Also, one target object was
randomly selected for each participant to be the only one of its kind
having a particular shape and color; this target object appeared with a
fixed frequency of .35. We selected this frequency because it is ap-
proximately midway between the ignorance priors of the target shape
(.25) and the target color (.50).
All participants viewed the set of objects that flashed 40 times, with each
object appearing on the screen for .25 s followed by a blank screen for .10 s.
The order in which objects appeared was randomized separately for each
participant. Participants in the enhanced salience condition were presented
with an object-bar at the top of the screen to remind them of the possible
attribute levels, as depicted in Appendix B. We displayed the object-bar
throughout the experiment (during instructions, learning, and judgment
phases), which we expected to provide a very salient visual cue of the different
attribute levels.
6 The position of the two colors and four shapes within the
object-bar were randomized for each participant in this condition.
Participants in the moderate salience condition were never shown an
object-bar or instructed on the possible attributes but were instead asked,
after viewing the objects, how many shapes and colors they had seen:
“Thinking about the set of objects you just observed and the characteristics
of those objects, how many distinct [shapes / colors] did you observe?”
6 We note that our use of this object-bar throughout the entire task in the
enhanced salience condition resembles the method used by Fiedler and
Armbruster (1994, Experiments 1 and 2) if one were to combine their
encoding-split and response-split conditions.
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attributes (each of the four possible shapes and two possible colors) in an
order that was randomized for each participant. For example, we asked, “If
an object were drawn at random from the exact same distribution you just
observed, what is the probability that the object is [a square / gray]?” For
participants in the moderate salience condition only, a sentence appeared at
the bottom of the screen during probability elicitation that was designed to
remind them of the attribute levels they had reported seeing: “You reported
observing X shapes and Y colors.” Finally, all participants were asked to
report their perceived domain knowledge and confidence in their memory
using the same items as in Study 1.
Results
Salience of attributes. When participants in the moderate sa-
lience condition were asked how many distinct shapes and colors
they had seen, the median number of shapes reported was 4 (SD 
0.79) and the median number of colors was 2 (SD  0.76). Of the
83 participants in this condition, 40 reported having seen exactly
four shapes and two colors, and a significant majority reported
having seen four shapes or two colors or both (72 of 83, p  .001).
Thus, as expected, participants in the moderate salience condition
appear to have encoded the attribute levels fairly accurately,
though the correct values were obviously not as transparent as in
the enhanced salience condition. In order to provide a comparable
test of partition dependence across experimental conditions, we
restricted our analyses in the moderate salience condition (except
as indicated) to the subset of participants who reported seeing four
shapes and two colors (i.e., the same partitions provided in the
enhanced salience condition). However, results for this subset (n 
40) did not differ markedly from results for the rest of the mod-
erate salience condition (n  83), as can be seen by comparing the
first two rows of Table 3.
Judgments of target events. The distributions of judged prob-
abilities for target shape and color are provided in Figures 2A and
2B for the moderate salience condition (overall and subset, respec-
tively) and Figure 2C for all participants in the enhanced salience
condition. It is evident from these Figures that partition depen-
dence is strong in the enhanced salience condition and greatly
diminished in the moderate salience condition. Participants in the
enhanced salience condition reported a median judged probability
of .45 when they were queried about the target color and a median
judged probability of .34 when they were queried about the target
shape (p  .001, by Wilcoxon test). In striking contrast, partici-
pants in the moderate salience condition exhibited no significant
partition dependence when queried about the two attributes of the
same target event. The median participant reported a judged prob-
ability of .30 for the target shape and .30 for the target color (p 
.49, by Wilcoxon test), with a median within-participant discrep-
ancy of 0, significantly less than the corresponding .10 discrepancy
in the enhanced salience condition (p  .009, by Kruskal–Wallis
test).
As shown in the top panel of Table 3, median estimates for
shape were quite close to the true frequency in both conditions,
whereas median estimates for color were midway between the true
frequency and ignorance prior for the enhanced salience condition
only. In the enhanced salience condition, the median judgment of
target color (.45) was significantly higher than the true frequency
of .35 (p  .001, by Wilcoxon test) and significantly lower than
the ignorance prior of 1/2 (p  .001), but the median judgment of
target shape (.34) was not significantly less than the true frequency
of .35 (p  .29). In the moderate salience condition, the median
judgment of target color (.30) was not significantly different than
the true frequency of .35 (p  .39, by Wilcoxon test), and the
median judgment of target shape (.30) was marginally lower than
the true frequency of .35 (p  .099).
A similar pattern holds in the analysis of individual participants
(see the last three columns of Table 3). In the enhanced salience
condition, a significant majority (65%) of participants judged the
probability of the target color to be greater than that of the target
shape (p  .005, by sign test), with only 11% judging the prob-
abilities of the target color and shape to be equal. In the moderate
salience condition, nearly twice as many participants (20%) judged
the probabilities of the target attributes to be equal, with fewer than
half (45%) of participants judging the probability of the target
color to be greater than that of the target shape.
Judgments of relative frequency. We again computed the cor-
relation for each participant between his or her probability judg-
Table 3
Results of Studies 2 and 3
Study p(target shape) p(target color)
p(color) 
p(shape)
p(color)  p(shape) p(color)  p(shape) p(color)  p(shape)
%%%
Study 2
Moderate salience (n  83) .30 .30 .00 46 20 34
Cognizant subset (n  40)
a .30 .30 .00 45 20 35
Low confidence (n  21) .30 .40 .05 57 14 29
High confidence (n  19) .30 .25 .00 32 26 42
Enhanced salience (n  84) .34 .45 .10 65
* 11 24
Low confidence (n  55) .30 .45 .10 65
* 13 22
High confidence (n  29) .35 .45 .10 65
* 72 8
Study 3
No-object-bar (n  73) .30 .30 .00 33 27 40
Retrieval-only (n  70) .35 .50 .10 63
** 14 23
Encoding  retrieval (n  86) .30 .50 .10 63
** 17 20
Note. Columns 2, 3, and 4 report median judged probabilities.
a Participants reporting seeing exactly four shapes and two colors.
* p  .025 (one-tailed) by sign test.
** p  .001 (one-tailed) by sign test.
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Figure 2. A: Distribution of probability judgments for target shape and color for the moderate salience condition of
Study 2 (n  83). B: Distribution of probability judgments for target shape and color for the moderate salience con-
dition of Study 2 (n  40 participants who reported seeing exactly four shapes and two colors). C: Distribution of
probability judgments for target shape and color for the enhanced salience condition of Study 2 (n  84).ments and the relevant objective probabilities for all six attributes.
We also computed a second measure that was independent of the
analyses of target judgments by computing the correlation of
judged and true probabilities for only the four nontarget attributes.
We computed these correlations separately for each experimental
condition. The median correlation for all six attributes was .85 for
the moderate salience condition and .73 for the enhanced salience
condition, a modest but significant difference (p  .013, two-
tailed). This difference disappeared when the nontarget judgments
were excluded: The median correlation was .96 for the moderate
salience condition and .91 for the enhanced salience condition
(p  .20, two-tailed). Thus, once again participants learned rela-
tive frequencies very well despite the intrusion of attribute-cued
ignorance priors for target judgments in the enhanced salience
condition.
Regression results. As in Study 1, we converted the data to
log-odds and ran individual-level regressions using all six judg-
ments made by each participant (four shapes, two colors). Results
are listed in the middle section of Table 2. Participants in the
enhanced salience condition appeared to rely on both the ignorance
prior (B  0.50) and observed frequency (B  0.43), as both
coefficients were significantly greater than zero (p  .001, by sign
test) and were not different from each other (p  .71, by Wilcoxon
test). Participants in the moderate salience condition, in contrast,
relied significantly more on observed frequency (B  0.97) than
the ignorance prior (p  .005, by Wilcoxon test) and in fact did
not put any appreciable weight on the ignorance prior (B  0.01,
ns). Note that the intercept term was not significant in either
condition (median of 0.00). Thus, unlike in Study 1, we see no
general upward or downward bias in assessed probability, only
attribute-cued partition dependence in the enhanced salience con-
dition. Importantly, reliance on ignorance prior versus true fre-
quency was significantly different between conditions. The median
weight afforded the ignorance prior was significantly lower in the
moderate salience condition than in the enhanced salience condi-
tion (p  .007, by Kruskal–Wallis test). On the other hand, true
frequency had more influence on judged probability in the mod-
erate salience condition than in the enhanced salience condition
(p  .002, by Kruskal–Wallis test). Overall, the regression results
show an effect of both ignorance prior and observed frequency for
the enhanced salience condition, but only an effect of frequency
for the moderate salience condition.
Confidence effects. Our second prediction concerned the in-
teraction of perceived competence with salience of attribute-cued
ignorance priors. We expected that when attribute levels were less
salient, reliance on ignorance priors would be more sensitive to
people’s confidence in their memory of the events and per-
ceived knowledge judging frequencies. The median confidence
judgment was 3.0, and the median knowledge judgment was
4.0. Unlike Study 1, these items did not form a reliable scale
(Cronbach’s .63), so we were unable to combine them into
an overall measure of perceived competence. Internal tests
revealed that the knowledge variable had no effects on any
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1393 PARTITION DEPENDENCE AND LEARNINGresults in the current sample, so we focused our analyses on
self-reported confidence in memory.
There were no differences in reported levels of confidence in
memory between the moderate salience condition (Mdn  3.0,
SD  1.35) and the enhanced salience condition (Mdn  3.0,
SD  1.18). This indicates that the manipulation of attribute
salience did not perturb levels of confidence, and hence differences
in partition dependence between the two conditions cannot be
explained by confidence. Examining the effects of confidence on
judgments of target events within each condition, we found that
participants in the enhanced salience condition did not exhibit a
relationship between confidence in memory and partition depen-
dence: The Spearman correlation between confidence and the
within-participant difference score for median ratings of the target
color and target shape was .06 (p  .29). In the moderate
salience condition, however, confidence did have an effect: The
Spearman correlation between confidence and the within-
participant difference score for median ratings of the target color
and target shape was .29 (p  .036).
To further probe this interaction effect, we conducted a median
split on the confidence measure to create low- and high-confidence
groups for each condition. As shown in Table 3, the median
within-participant difference between judged probabilities of tar-
get color and shape among those who rated themselves as highly
confident in their memory in the moderate salience condition was
.00, whereas the median difference among those who rated them-
selves as less confident was .05, significantly larger (p  .05, by
Kruskal–Wallis test). In the enhanced salience condition, Table 3
shows that the median within-participant difference was .10 for
both highly confident participants and those who rated themselves
as less confident (p  .42, by Kruskal–Wallis test). Thus, as
expected, confidence significantly affected the degree of partition
dependence in target judgments for participants in the moderate
salience condition only.
We also examined the regression results to see how self-
reported confidence affected weights afforded ignorance priors
versus true frequency, again using a median split of the confidence
variable to compare unstandardized coefficients within each ex-
perimental condition. Median coefficients for the low- and high-
confidence groups are listed in Table 2 and reveal significantly
more reliance on true frequency (p  .04, by Kruskal–Wallis test)
and less reliance on the ignorance prior (p  .06, by Kruskal–
Wallis test) among those in the moderate salience condition who
rated themselves as more confident versus less confident.
7 For the
enhanced salience condition, the relatively equal weight on fre-
quency and the ignorance prior did not vary significantly with
level of confidence (p  .40 for both comparisons).
Discussion
Study 2 provides further evidence that judged probabilities are
influenced by both observed frequencies and ignorance priors. We
demonstrated attribute-cued partition dependence using a simpli-
fied ad hoc state space in which attribute levels were perfectly
correlated. Partition dependence was strong and consistent when
alternative partitions of the state space were made salient through
the presence of an object-bar, but partition dependence was not
found when alternative partitions were less salient. In addition, we
observe that the influence of the ignorance prior in the enhanced
salience condition was stronger for the color attribute than for the
shape attribute; we return to this result in the General Discussion.
Perhaps most interesting, Study 2 demonstrates that partition
dependence is more pronounced among those who are less confi-
dent in their memory for true frequencies only when alternative
partitions are less salient. Likewise, regression analysis revealed
that greater confidence is associated with more reliance on true
frequency and less reliance on ignorance priors only when parti-
tions are less salient. Confidence had no effect on the degree of
partition dependence or on the weights afforded observed fre-
quency versus ignorance priors in the enhanced salience condition.
This pattern of results supports our view that reliance on ignorance
priors often reflects the simple psychological tendency to incor-
porate cues that are salient, even though such cues may not always
be relevant. Ignorance priors can thus resemble anchors that con-
taminate judgment of even highly confident or knowledgeable
individuals.
The finding that partition salience influences the impact of
ignorance priors prompts the question of whether salient cues (a)
interfere with encoding of relative frequencies during the learning
phase or (b) bias retrieval or expression of frequencies at the time
of elicitation. Hastie and Park (1986) argued that the potential
exists both for memory to bias on-line judgment (biased encoding)
and for on-line judgment to bias memory (biased retrieval). The
studies we have presented so far cannot distinguish among these
possibilities; for example, in Study 2 the object-bar was presented
during both learning and probability elicitation for the enhanced
salience condition. However, Fiedler and Armbruster (1994) in-
vestigated encoding and retrieval processes in the context of a
different judgment phenomenon, the category-split effect (a man-
ifestation of explicit subadditivity; see Rottenstreich & Tversky,
1997). In one of their studies, they showed participants a distribu-
tion of five objects: four geometric symbols, one of which ap-
peared in two different orientations. Some participants were ver-
bally told of the four symbols (without mentioning that one symbol
appeared in two different orientations) and asked to estimate the
frequency of the four symbols; others were graphically presented
with all five objects and asked to estimate the frequency of the five
objects. The authors observed that the sum of estimates for differ-
ent orientations of an object (e.g., “pentagons pointing up” and
“pentagons pointing down”) was greater than the single estimate of
the object’s overall frequency (e.g., “pentagons”) and that graph-
ically presenting the objects and their different orientations during
likelihood elicitation (retrieval) was sufficient for this category-
split effect to emerge.
In Study 3, we investigate whether the phenomenon of attribute-
cued partition dependence will likewise emerge when alternative
partitions are salient only during probability elicitation (retrieval),
or whether the effect also requires alternative partitions to be
salient during learning (encoding). If partition dependence requires
partitions to be salient during both encoding and retrieval, it may
suggest that partitions influence judgment by defining the catego-
ries into which data are organized as they are learned. If partition
7 We also examined the median within-participant difference between
weight on the ignorance prior and weight on observed frequency for
participants in the moderate salience condition. The difference was mar-
ginally higher for the high-confidence group relative to the low-confidence
group (p  .06).
1394 SEE, FOX, AND ROTTENSTREICHdependence occurs even when partitions are salient only during
retrieval, it would lend additional support for our notion that
salient ignorance priors serve as prominent cues that can contam-
inate judgment.
Study 3: Encoding Versus Retrieval
In Study 3, we replicated the method of Study 2 with a first
group of participants submitted to the enhanced salience condition
in which an object-bar was displayed both during the learning and
the probability elicitation phases. A second group of participants
was presented with an object-bar only during the elicitation of
probabilities. Finally, a third group of participants was not pre-
sented with an object-bar at all.
As with the previous study, we expect attribute-cued partitions
to be much less salient when the object-bar does not appear so that
partition dependence will be less pronounced in the condition with
no object-bar than in the condition in which an object-bar is
present throughout the task. Moreover, if partition dependence
reflects reliance on salient ignorance priors that intrude much like
anchors whenever they are accessible, we would expect to observe
significant partition dependence even when the object-bar appears
only at the time of judgment. If that occurs, we would expect to
observe relatively accurate judgments in the condition in which no
object-bar is present, consistent with automaticity of frequency
encoding (Hasher & Zacks, 1984), but should see partition depen-
dence in other conditions in which attributes are made salient at
some point during the task.
Method
Participants. We recruited 229 Duke University undergraduates to
participate in a series of unrelated experiments lasting approximately 20
min and for which they were paid $5.
Design and procedure. The experiment was administered on laptop
computers in a private meeting room in the student union. The design
features of this study and stimuli are exactly the same as Study 2 except as
indicated below.
Participants were assigned at random to one of three experimental
conditions that varied only in terms of whether the visual object-bar used
in the enhanced salience condition of Study 2 was presented throughout the
task or only during the elicitation of probabilities. Participants assigned to
the encoding-plus-retrieval condition (n  86) saw the object-bar through-
out the instructions, presentation of flashed objects, and elicitation of
judged probabilities, exactly as in the enhanced salience condition of Study
2. Participants assigned to the retrieval-only condition (n  70) saw the
object-bar only at the time of judgment after they had observed the
presentation of objects. The object-bar was introduced to participants in
this condition at the probability elicitation phase with the statement: “Each
object you saw could have been one of four shapes shown above (triangle,
circle, square, diamond) and one of two colors (gray or black).” Finally,
participants assigned to the no-object-bar condition (n  73) were never
presented with an object-bar and were given no instruction concerning the
possible attribute levels at any point during the study.
Results
Judgments of target events. The distributions of judged prob-
abilities for target shapes and colors are depicted in Figure 3A for
the no-object-bar condition, Figure 3B for the retrieval-only con-
dition, and Figure 3C for the encoding-plus-retrieval condition.
Results are consistent with the notion that reliance on ignorance
priors requires partitions to be salient only during retrieval. Par-
ticipants in the encoding-plus-retrieval condition were strongly
influenced by attribute-cued ignorance priors, replicating the re-
sults of the enhanced salience condition of Study 2. As shown in
the bottom section of Table 3, the median participant in this group
reported a judged probability of .30 when queried about the target
shape and .50 when queried about the target color (p  .001, by
Wilcoxon test). Similarly, participants in the retrieval-only condi-
tion reported a median judged probability of .35 for shape and .50
for color (p  .001, by Wilcoxon test). The median within-
participant discrepancy between judgment of the target color and
shape was .10 in both the retrieval-only and encoding-plus-
retrieval conditions, which did not differ significantly (p  .49,
two-tailed, by Kruskal–Wallis test). As with Study 2, partition
dependence seems to be stronger for the color attribute in this
study.
In contrast, participants in the no-object-bar condition exhibited
no significant partition dependence when queried about the two
attributes of the same target event: The median participant reported
a judged probability of .30 for the target shape and .30 for the
target color (p  .16, by Wilcoxon test), with a median within-
participant discrepancy of .00, significantly less than the corre-
sponding discrepancy in the retrieval-only condition (p  .001, by
Kruskal–Wallis test) and encoding-plus-retrieval condition (p 
.001, by Kruskal–Wallis test). However, the median target shape
judgment of .30 across all three conditions, which is midway
between the true frequency of .35 and the ignorance prior of .25,
suggests that there was some partition dependence for the shape
attribute; we return to this result in the General Discussion.
A similar pattern holds at the level of individual participants
(see Table 3). In both the retrieval-only and the encoding-plus-
retrieval conditions, nearly two thirds of participants judged the
target color to be more likely than the target shape, whereas fewer
than one quarter of participants judged the target color to be less
likely than the target shape (p  .001, by sign test for both
conditions). However, in the no-object-bar condition, about as
many participants judged the target color to be more likely than the
target shape as the converse (p  .32, by sign test). In sum,
judgments of the target shape and color suggest that participants
who were shown the object-bar only at the time of elicitation
responded similarly to those who were shown the object-bar
throughout the experiment, but these groups differed substantially
from those who were never shown the object-bar.
Judgments of relative frequency. The median correlation be-
tween judged and true probability for all six attributes was .81 for
the no-object-bar condition, .75 for the retrieval-only condition,
and .79 for the encoding-plus-retrieval condition. For the nontarget
attributes, the median correlation between judged and true proba-
bility was .97 for the no-object-bar condition, .93 for the retrieval-
only condition, and .95 for the encoding-plus-retrieval condition.
As in the previous studies, participants showed impressive learning
of relative frequencies, and median correlations were not statisti-
cally distinguishable between conditions (p  .26 across all com-
parisons). Echoing previous research on probability biases in
learning paradigms, which has documented similarly high aggre-
gate correlations between judged and true probability (e.g., Wind-
schitl et al., 2002), we found that the biased patterns of attribute-
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Figure 3. A: Distribution of probability judgments for target shape and color for the no-object-bar
condition of Study 3 (n  73). B: Distribution of probability judgments for target shape and color for the
retrieval-only condition of Study 3 (n  70). C: Distribution of probability judgments for target shape and
color for the encoding-plus-retrieval condition of Study 3 (n  86).cued partition dependence occurred in the context of otherwise
quite accurate judgments of relative frequency.
Regression results. We again converted the data to log-odds
and regressed, for each participant, judged probability on attribute-
cued ignorance priors and true frequency. The results of this
analysis are displayed in Table 2. For the no-object-bar condition,
the median coefficient of the ignorance prior was negligible (B 
0.04, p  .30, by sign test), whereas the median coefficient for
frequency was substantial (B  0.80, p  .001). Within the
retrieval-only and encoding-plus-retrieval conditions, however,
participants gave roughly equal weight to the ignorance prior and
true frequency; the two coefficients in both conditions were sig-
nificantly different from zero (p  .001). Moreover, the coeffi-
cients were statistically indistinguishable from each other between
the retrieval-only and encoding-plus-retrieval conditions (p  .87
(two-tailed) for frequency and p  .63 (two-tailed) for ignorance
prior by Kruskal–Wallis test). However, the median results in the
no-object-bar condition differed significantly from the other two
groups. Participants in the no-object-bar condition relied signifi-
cantly less on the ignorance prior (p  .001, by Kruskal–Wallis
test) and significantly more on true frequency (p  .01, by
Kruskal–Wallis test) relative to the other two conditions. Finally,
we note that as in Study 2, the median intercept was precisely 0 for
all three conditions (see Table 2). This suggests that unlike Study
1, there was no overall bias in judged probabilities other than the
bias toward attribute-cued ignorance priors.
Discussion
Study 3 provides new evidence that intrusion of the ignorance
prior occurs at the time of retrieval (or probability construction)
rather than at the time of learning. In the no-object-bar condition,
the only systematic inaccuracy we uncovered was a slight ten-
dency for shape judgments to be biased toward the shape igno-
rance prior, which may have been more accessible without an
object-bar than the color attribute. Evidently, participants in this
condition relied primarily on retrieval of automatically encoded
frequency information (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). However, in the
encoding-plus-retrieval and retrieval-only conditions, judged prob-
abilities were systematically biased toward the corresponding ig-
norance prior. This pattern of results is consistent with our inter-
pretation that relatively accurate encoding of frequency
information can subsequently be contaminated by salient cues
concerning the number of possible events. It is interesting to note
that, in learning studies of phenomena as diverse as partition
dependence (the present article) and the category-split effect
(Fiedler & Armbruster, 1994), it appears that judgmental bias
requires biasing information to be present only during retrieval.
General Discussion
Substantial past research has suggested that people are adept at
automatically registering counts of events that they have observed
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1397 PARTITION DEPENDENCE AND LEARNING(e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1984), whereas at the same time, relative
frequency and proportion estimations may be biased toward 1/2 or
other salient reference points (e.g., Hollands & Dyre, 2000). In the
present article, we attempted to integrate these disparate literatures
by proposing that people typically rely on both a somewhat accu-
rate recollection of true frequencies and an ignorance prior derived
from the number of elementary events into which the judge sub-
jectively partitions the state space. This can give rise to partition
dependence, in which judged probabilities vary systematically
with the number of elementary events into which the state space is
subjectively parsed.
Previous work has demonstrated that alternative partitions can
be made salient either by explicitly providing alternative sets of
exclusive and exhaustive events for participants to assess (Fox &
Clemen, 2005) or by varying the language of the probability query
(Fox & Levav, 2004; Fox & Rottenstreich, 2003; Smithson &
Segale, 2006). In this article, we observe for the first time that
alternative partitions can also be cued by drawing attention to
different attributes that vary in the number of levels they can take
on. We present a simple hypothetical example (the auto dealership
cited in the introduction) and three studies that provide the first
evidence of (a) within-participant partition dependence, (b) that is
cued by attributes, and (c) which occurs in a controlled learning
environment. Study 1 used a familiar state space (based on days of
the week and meals of the day) for which attribute-cued partitions
would be naturally accessible to participants and showed that
reliance on ignorance priors is affected by perceived competence
judging frequencies. Study 2 used an unfamiliar ad hoc state space
(objects that varied in shape and color) in which attribute-cued
partitions were made more salient to some participants via an
externally provided visual cue and showed that salience of the
partition moderates the impact of confidence on partition depen-
dence. In particular, when partitions were made especially salient
through presentation of an object-bar, partition dependence was
not related to feelings of confidence. Finally, Study 3 revealed that
partition dependence does not require that attribute-cued ignorance
priors be salient during learning (encoding) but rather that it occurs
even when they are made available only at the time of probability
elicitation (retrieval).
Attributes as Categories Versus Properties
It is notable that reliance on ignorance priors in Studies 2 and 3
seemed to be stronger for the color attribute than for the shape
attribute. In fact, median judgments for target shape were quite
accurate. This observation accords with the results of Barsalou and
Ross (1986), who found that participants were highly accurate in
reporting the number of instances presented from superordinate
categories (e.g., birds) but that their estimates of the frequencies of
properties (e.g., red) were less accurate (see also Conrad, Brown,
& Dashen, 2003). Johnson, Peterson, Yap, and Rose (1989) further
found that an item’s membership in a particular category must be
salient for participants to accurately judge the relative frequency of
that category. Similarly, Freund and Hasher (1989) found that
participants were more accurate estimating a category’s frequency
if they had been informed in advance that they would be asked to
judge the frequency of that category (see also Burton & Blair,
1991; Conrad, Brown, & Cashman, 1998).
We suspect that participants in our studies had an easier time
accessing the number of distinct shapes (a category that is pro-
cessed more spontaneously) than the number of distinct colors (a
property that may be less salient without external prompting), and
hence, they demonstrated a stronger impression of the relative
frequency of shapes than of color. We surmise that shape acted like
a superordinate category, more readily identifying objects than
color, a property that refines the identification of the object.
To What Extent Is Reliance on Ignorance Priors Bayesian?
Our main purpose in this article has been to investigate the
impact of the nature of events (true frequency) versus the number
of events (attribute-cued ignorance priors) on likelihood judgment.
Though our theoretical framework is descriptive in nature, one
could argue that some instances of reliance on ignorance priors
might be interpreted as normatively defensible Bayesian behavior.
For example, the results of Study 1 showing that the impact of
ignorance priors decreased when people were more confident in
what they had learned might be consistent with a Bayesian account
whereby people begin with prior beliefs that receipts are evenly
distributed over all three meals and all seven days and perceive
their impressions of relative likelihood to be more diagnostic of
true frequencies as confidence increases.
The results of Study 2 showing that reliance on the ignorance
prior is not sensitive to confidence when partitions are especially
salient is less readily accommodated within a Bayesian framework
without additional assumptions about the diagnostic value of sa-
lience. In addition, manifestations of partition dependence outside
of a learning paradigm may be difficult to rationalize. We note
from previous research that reliance on ignorance priors can in-
fluence judgment even in situations in which they imply peculiar
Bayesian priors. For instance, Fox and Rottenstreich (2003) found
that people asked to judge the probability that “next week, the
highest temperature of the week will occur on Sunday” were
biased toward 1/7 (a reasonable prior implied by a sevenfold
partition by days of the week); however, people asked to judge the
probability that “the temperature on Sunday will be higher than
every other day next week” were biased toward 1/2 (a peculiar
prior implied by a twofold partition by whether or not the state-
ment is true). Likewise, the car dealership example in the intro-
duction shows that even though participants can observe that “cars
sold by Carlos” and “coupes” refer to the same event, they nev-
ertheless seem to adopt different ignorance priors to these queries
rather than a single compound prior, a particularly striking pattern
of description dependence when replicated within-participant (see
Footnote 2).
Even if one views reliance on ignorance priors as Bayesian, the
critical questions remain what factors influence the priors that
people happen to invoke and what factors influence their weight in
judgment. In this respect the cognitive account advanced here
contributes to the literature on judgment under uncertainty by
demonstrating that (a) prior beliefs are often influenced by the
number of qualitatively distinct levels that a target attribute may
take on, (b) the relative weight afforded these priors versus learned
information is a function of factors including confidence in learn-
ing and salience of attributes, and (c) salience can moderate the
impact confidence so that when an ignorance prior is especially
salient it can influence judgment regardless of one’s level of
confidence.
The tendency to rely on salient ignorance priors irrespective of
confidence is interesting given the very high median correlations
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studies in which information was provided to participants rather
quickly. This supports the notion that people often automatically
encode relative frequency information quite accurately (Hasher &
Zacks, 1984), and thus reliance on ignorance priors may serve to
bias otherwise accurate judgment toward arbitrary reference
points. In this sense, ignorance priors can contaminate responses
much like judgmental anchors. Some prescriptive suggestions for
improving accuracy of judged probabilities that may be influenced
by ignorance priors have been offered by Fox and Clemen (2005).
In addition, Clemen and Ulu (2006) have offered a procedure to
counteract bias toward ignorance priors in the context of a Bayes-
ian model of probability judgment.
Future Research
What partitions do people naturally invoke? Previous demon-
strations of partition dependence have manipulated the relative
accessibility of alternative partitions using explicit prompts. Fox
and Clemen (2005) asked participants to consider state spaces that
were explicitly divided into different sets of events to be judged, as
is common practice in decision analysis. Fox and Rottenstreich
(2003) used linguistic formulations that either highlighted a target
event against its complement or highlighted a set of interchange-
able events (e.g., days of the week). Likewise, Fox and Levav
(2004) used alternative formulations of common probability puz-
zles to prompt different subjective partitions of state spaces that
gave rise to a different proportion of correct responses.
In the present studies, we directed participants’ attention to
alternative attributes of various state spaces, but we did not oth-
erwise explicitly prompt consideration of alternative partitions. In
the restaurant study, participants seem to have spontaneously in-
voked a sevenfold partition for days of the week and a threefold
partition for meals of the day. In the colored shapes studies, we
simultaneously made both shape-based and color-based partitions
accessible for some participants through presentation of an object-
bar. Although the manipulation of partition salience in the present
studies was arguably more subtle than were the manipulations used
in previous articles, participants in our studies seemed to naturally
invoke the partition cued by the attribute on which they were
focusing their attention, and they were therefore biased toward the
corresponding ignorance prior.
We surmise from the present results and those of previous
studies cited above that at least partial reliance on ignorance priors
is nearly ubiquitous. The default is to rely on a twofold “case”
partition {target event occurs; target event does not occur} and an
ignorance prior of 1/2, because these are always accessible when
a target event is identified. However, in various contexts (such as
the restaurant study) attributes may naturally cue “class” partitions
by the number of levels of an attribute or the accessibility of a class
of n interchangeable events. For ad hoc state spaces in which there
are no such natural classes of interchangeable events, we suspect
that the partitions that people invoke are influenced by how they
construe the topology of the state space. Indeed, even in the
no-object-bar condition of Study 3 in which we observed no
partition dependence, we suspect that many participants relied on
ignorance priors that were the same for the target color and shape.
We note that judged probabilities in that condition (Mdn  .30 for
both target shape and color) tended to lie below the true value of
.35, biased in the direction of an integrated object-cued ignorance
prior of 1/4 (recall that four unique objects were presented to
participants). More generally, we surmise that for state spaces
containing a small number of events, integrated object-cued par-
titions may take precedence over attribute-cued partitions, espe-
cially when attributes can be integrated into whole objects or
distinctive events (cf. Brase, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1998).
8 Further
investigation of what kinds of partitions people spontaneously
invoke in natural settings is an important avenue for future re-
search.
In addition, it would be interesting to examine naturally occur-
ring instantiations of attribute-cued partition dependence. In many
social contexts, natural attributes such as ethnicity or gender may
suggest a number of discrete categories and therefore different
ignorance priors. For instance, if a large set of candidates for a job
includes several women and men who are African American, Asian
American, Hispanic, and White, the judged probability that a woman
is hired may be biased toward 1/2, whereas the judged probability that
an Asian American is hired may be biased toward 1/4.
The role of confidence in memory. One of the more provoca-
tive findings of the present investigation is how readily people
shift away from their relatively accurate impressions of frequency
toward an ignorance prior when one is accessible. When attribute-
cued partitions are only moderately salient, a critical factor influ-
encing reliance on observed frequencies is an individual’s feeling
of confidence or knowledge. Indeed for the self-generated parti-
tions in Study 1 and moderate salience condition of Study 2,
partition dependence was stronger among those who rated them-
selves as less confident in memory. These findings are interesting
in that they might suggest that subjective perceptions of one’s
memory are sufficient to affect probability judgment in learning
environments, which builds on earlier work showing that individ-
ual differences in objective working memory can have important
effects on probability judgment (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden,
1999; Dougherty & Hunter, 2003; Sprenger & Dougherty, 2006).
This said, participants exhibited very accurate judged relative
frequencies across the studies, but the correlation between judged
relative frequency and reported confidence in memory was only
.10 (p  .05) in Study 1 and .15 (p  .05) in Study 2. Thus, it
appears that people are largely unaware of the extent to which they
have accurately encoded frequencies and may be prone to dis-
counting their automatic counts. Future research might explore
whether accuracy can be improved (at least in situations in which
attribute-cued partitions are not especially salient) by boosting
people’s confidence in their ability to automatically encode fre-
quency information.
Conclusion
Throughout this article we have contrasted judgment based on
the number of possible events (reliance on ignorance priors) with
judgment based on the nature of those events (direct observation of
relative frequency). Analysis of the balance struck between these
two processes suggests that people both encode frequencies rela-
tively accurately and are influenced by ignorance priors and that
8 We note that although the state space in the Fletcher auto sales example
on the first and second pages of the introduction contained only four
relevant events, the attributes of model and salesperson could not be readily
integrated into a single whole object or distinctive event.
1399 PARTITION DEPENDENCE AND LEARNINGuse of ignorance priors does not vary as a function of confidence
when partitions are very salient. In addition, the present article
provides the first demonstration of partition dependence within-
participant, using attribute-cued partitions, and in a controlled
learning environment. We hope that the present investigation will
encourage further attempts to integrate the distinct yet complimen-
tary literatures on frequency encoding, categorization, and judg-
ment under uncertainty.
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Appendix A
The Ignorance Prior Model
To provide a more rigorous formulation of partition dependence,
we describe Fox and Rottenstreich’s (2003) formal model of
partition dependence that generalizes support theory (Rottenstreich
& Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994) to incorporate reli-
ance on ignorance priors.
In support theory, judged probability, P(.), depends on the
“support” or strength of evidence for a focal hypothesis, F (e.g.,
this person is a Democrat) relative to the support or strength of
evidence for an alternative hypothesis, A (e.g., this person is not a
Democrat). Denoting the support function by s, the judged prob-
ability that F will occur rather than A, is given by
P(F,A) 
s(F)
s(F)  s(A).
Letting R(F, A)  P(F, A)/	1  P(F, A)
 be the odds for the focal
hypothesis relative to the alternative hypothesis, we can rewrite the
expression above as the following:
R(F,A) 
s(F)
s(A).
We can distinguish between support arising from the ignorance
prior and support generated by evaluative methods by rewriting the
expression above as
R(F,A) 
nF
nA
1 
s
*(F)
s
*(A)

.
Here nf and na are the number of elements in the subjective
partition corresponding to the focal and alternative hypotheses,
respectively. For instance, for the Fletcher example in the intro-
duction of this article, we assume that nf  1 and na  1 for most
people when the target attribute is models (coupe, sedan) and that
nf  1 and na  3 for most people when the target attribute is
salesperson (Carlos, Jennifer, Damon, Sebastian). The values s
*(F)
and s
*(A) quantify support generated through evaluative methods.
For the present purposes, we assume that these values reflect
participants’ recall of the relative frequencies of each object.
Finally, 0    1 is the weight given to evaluative assessments
relative to the ignorance prior. As  approaches 1, judged proba-
bility is based entirely on evaluative assessments; in contrast, as 
approaches 0, judged probability collapses to the ignorance prior.
Note that whenever 0 (positive weight is afforded the igno-
rance prior) judged probabilities will exhibit some degree of par-
tition dependence.
Taking the log of both sides of the previous equation yields:
ln R(F,A)  1 ln
nF
nA  2 ln
s
*(F)
s
*(A),
where 1  1 is the weight afforded the ignorance prior and
2 is the weight afforded evaluative assessments. If we
assume that hypothetical support for a particular event is a power
function of its raw frequency, f,w eg e t
s
*(.) 	 f(.)

k,
where k is a scaling constant. For instance, k  1 implies that
support for an attribute is a concave function of the number of
presentations of that attribute (for fuller discussions of scaling
support, see Fox, 1999; Koehler, 1996; Tversky & Koehler, 1994).
Thus, by regressing participants’ judgments on the ignorance prior
and on the objective frequencies of each object (all transformed to
log-odds format), we can obtain a measure of the relative weight
placed on the ignorance prior and on evaluative methods. If we
also include an intercept term, we can detect whether there is
residual bias in probability assessment:
ln R(F,A)  1 ln
nf
na  2 ln
f(F)
f(A).
(Appendixes continue)
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Experimental Design Features of Studies 2 and 3
Participants watched a set of multiattribute objects flash on the computer screen (one at a time)
with varying frequencies and were then asked to judge the probability of these events. Each object
could take on one of four shapes and one of two colors (see Figure B1). A target object was
randomly selected for each participant to have a fixed frequency of .35 and take on a unique shape
and color. For example, for a particular trial the target object might be a “black triangle,” thus the
other objects in the set would be a gray circle, gray square, and gray diamond, as shown below.
The ignorance prior probability is 1/n, where n is the number of distinct features of an event or
object. Thus, the ignorance prior of a particular shape  1/4, because n  4 shapes; and the
ignorance prior of a particular color  1/2, because n  2 colors (see Figure B2).
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